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352 PEOPLE V. KELLUM [71 C.2d 
[Crim. No. 13271. In Bank. June 18, 1969.] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. WENDELL 
KELt Ul\1:, Defendant and Appellant. 
[1] Criminal Law-Appeal-Reversible Error-Evidence--Admis-
sions.-Reversal of defendant's conviction of rape and assault 
with intent to commit rape was required,where prejudicial 
admissions introduced against him at his trial were obtained in 
violation of the Escobedo-Dorado rules, where defendant's 
trial was held prior to Escobedo but entry of judgment was 
postponed by his commitment pursuant to sexual psychopathy 
proceedings under fo"rmer Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5500 et seq., 
where defendant was subsequently found to be not amena.ble" 
to treatment and was sentenced to· imprisonment, where he 
was seeking Rppellate review of his conviction for the first 
time, and where defendant was in no way to· blame for the 
delay in the finality of the judgment against him (disapprov- . 
ing to the extent it is inconsistent herewith, People v. W.l-
liams (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 951 [71 Cal.Rptr. 871]). 
APPEAL -from a judgment of the Superior Court of Ala-
meda County and from orders of commitment. Redmond C. 
Staats, Jr., and Leonard Dieden,Judges. Judgment reversed; 
orders vacated. 
Prosecution for assault with intent to commit rape and for 
forcible rape. Judgment of conviction reversed. 
-Lloyd B. Egenes, under appointment by the SupremeCourt,-
for Defendant and Appellant. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, RobertR. Granucci" 
and Michael Buzzell, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-In 1963 a jury found defendant guilty 
of one count of assault with intent to commit rape (Pen. 
Code, § 220) and one count of forcible rape (Pen. Code, § 261, 
subd. 4). Before sentencing, the court adjourned the criminal 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Rev., Evidence, § 496; Am.Jur.2d, Evidence, 
§ 555. 
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proceedings and instituted sexual psychopathy! proceedings. 
(Welf. &. Inst. Code, § 5500 et seq.) Pursuant to such proceed-
ings, defendant was committed to Atascadero State Hospital. 
In June 1967 the court held a hearing and found "that the 
defendant ·is still a mentally disordered sex offender and not 
amenable to treatment." It thereupon reinstituted the crimi-
nal proceedings and in November 1967 sentenced defendant to 
imprisonment .for the term prescribed by law. Defendant. 
appeals. 
Defendant contends that at his trial prejudicial admissions 
were introduced against him that were obtained in violation 
of the rules subsequently announced in Escobedo v. Illinois 
(1964) 378 U.S. 478 [12 L.Ed.2d 977, 84 S.Ct. 1758] and 
People v. Dorado (1965) 62 Cal.2d 338 [42 Cal.Rpt.r. 169, 398 
P.2d 361]. Since we have held that those rules apply to all 
cases not final before Escobedo was decided on June 2.2, 1964 
(Pepple v. Rollins (1967) 65 Cal.2d 681, 691 [56 Cal.Rptr. 
293,423 P .2d 221] ; In re Lopez (1965) 62 Cal.2d 368, 372: [42 
Cal.Rptr. 188, 398 P.2d 380] ; In re Shipp (19'65) 62 Cal.2d 
547,549 [43 Cal.Rptr. 3, 399 P.2d 571]), defendant concludes 
that the judgment must be reversed. The Attorney General 
contends that cases such as this one, which was tried before 
Escobedo but in which entry of judgment was postponed 
owing to a conmlitment under the provisions of the 'Velfare 
and Institutions Code, should be treated as exceptions to the 
rule of the Lopez case. He points out that such an exception is 
permissible under the holding in Johnson . v. NeW' Jersey 
(1966) 384 U.S. 719 [16 L.Ed.2d 882:, 86 S.Ct. 1772:], that 
·--·statecourts are not constitutionally compelledto~applyEsco­
bedo to cases in which trial commenced before June 22, 1964. 
He invokes People v. Rivers (1967) 66. Cal.2d 1000 [59' Cal. 
Rptr. 851, 429 P.2d 171] in which we held that Escobedo and 
Dorado are not applicable to cases in which the judgments 
became final before Escobedo was decided under then existing 
appellate procedures but in which remittiturs were recalled 
after Escobedo to meet evolving standards of representation 
of counsel on appeal. 
1 ~hese proceedings are now called mentally disordered sex offender pro-
('~('dll1gs. The article definillg alld describing the disposition of mentan~T 
dIsordered sex offenders, formerly. codified as 'Welfare and Institutio1l8 
Code sections 5500-5522, has been )'ecodified as \Velfare and Institutions 
Code sections 6300-6330. The section numbers appearing in the text con-
form to the old classification. 
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[1] 'Ve believe that the controlling decision is not Rivers 
but Rollins.2 In Rollins, we squarely confronted the question 
whether in view of J onnson we should continue to apply 
Escobedo and Dorado to pending appeals in cases tried before 
Escobedo. We determined that we should. We pointed out 
that our application of Escobedo to all cases still pending on 
direct review when Escobedo was decided was consistent with 
the settled law before J ohnson ~as decided, that to continue 
to so apply Escobedo would impose no major burden on the 
administration of justice, and that to cease do~ng so. would 
give rise to wholly arbitrary inequalities. "The vast majority 
of cases in California which had not become final prior to 
June 22, 1964, have by this time been disposed of on appeal in 
accordance with the teaching of Escobedo and Dorado. Ac-
cordingly, we need not invite the anomalies and the manifest 
injustice which the rejection of. Lopez, at the virtual end of 
its natural life, would entail. Thus ... we adhere to .Lopez 
in applying Escobedo and Dorado to the instant case and to 
all other cases which had not become final before· June 22, 
1964." (People v. Rollins, supra, 65 Cal.2d at p. 691.) 
Defendant is a member of the precise class we deemed 
entitled to protection from arbitrary discrimination in Rol-
lins, namely, those tried before Escobedo whose convictions 
,vere still subject to review when J onnson was decided. . 
Defendant is in no way to blame for the delay in the finality 
of the judgment against him, for that delay was, until the 
1968 amendment to P~nal Code section 1237, inherent in the 
statutory provisions governing ,commitment and appellate 
procedures. (P~ople v. Gonzales (1968) 68 Cal.2d 467, 471 [67 
----.---~-~ Cal.Rptr.551, 439P.2d 655].) -Finally, to deny persons -such-
as defendant the benefit of Escobedo would create additional 
discriminations within the class to which h~ belongs. Thus, 
those tried before Escobedo but against whom no judgment 
was entered until after J onnson would receive the benefit of 
Escobedo if they had the foresight to invoke Escobedo on 
motion for new trial or on appeal from the denial of such a 
motion during the interval bet.ween Escobedo and J ohnson~ 
but would be denied the benefit of Escobedo if they elected 
instead, while rehabilitative treatment continued, not to chal-
lenge the validity of their convictions until appealable judg-
ments were entered against them. People v. Gonzales, supra, . 
forbids such discrimination; 
There is nothing in Rivers contrary to our conclusion 
2To the extent that People v. Williams (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 951 
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herein. In that case we were concerned with defendants who 
had exhausted allavenues of appellate review before Escobedo 
was decided and whose judgments would have remained final 
but for the decision in Douglas v. Oalifornia (1963) 372 U.S. 
353 [9 L.Ed.2d 811, 83 S.Ct. 814], requiring representation of 
counsel on appeal. Those defendants were not part of the 
class considered in. Rollins; namely, those tried before Esco-
bedo whose judgments were never reviewed on appeal until 
after J ohmon. They represented a separate category that 
threatened to be of _ significant quantity. Considerations of 
equality also dictated that they should be treated, not as 
though their appeals had never been decided, but according to 
the law applicable when their first appeals were decided. 
Otherwise, "the indigent defendant' deprived of counsel 
anomalously would find himself possessed of more shafts in 
his quiver than would have been the case had he been able to 
afford to properly arm himself in the first instance." (People 
v. Garner (1965) 234 Cal.App.2d 212, 215-216, fn. 1 [44 Cal. 
Rptr. 217].) Moreover, allowing such defendants to invoke 
Escobedo as a byproduct of Douglas would have involved the 
serious difficulties of retrials long after the events involved 
had occurred. In the present case, defendant is seeking appel-
late review of his conviction for the first time. Allowing him 
to invoke Escobedo affords him no "more shafts in his 
quiver" than he would have had if he had raised Escobedo 
by motion for new trial soon after it was decided. The difficul-
ties of a belated retrial arise, not from the reopening of an 
apparently final judgment,but from the statutory provisions 
that provided for appeals from judgments that need not have 
been entered until long after the underlying convictions on 
which they were based. 
Although defendant is no longer being held pursuant to the 
temporary and indefinite orders committing him to Atasca-
dero, he is entitled to challenge those orders to clear his 
record. (People v. Succop (1967) 67 Cal.2d 785, 789-790 [63 
Cal.Rptr. 569, 433 P.2d 473].) Since a valid commitment must 
be based upon a valid conviction (In re Bevill (1968) 68 
Cal.2d 854, 862-863 [69 Cal.Rptr. 599, 442· P.2d 679] ; Welf. & 
Inst. Code, § 5501), the orders of commitment must be 
vacated. 
The orders committing defendant to Atascadero State Hos-
pital are vacated. The judgment is reversed. 
l\fcComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., 
and Sullivan, J" concurr:ed. 
